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Introduction to the Special Issue: Islamic State’s Online Activity 
and Responses, 2014 – 2017 
 
Maura Conway, Dublin City University 
maura.conway@dcu.ie  
Stuart Macdonald, Swansea University 
s.macdonald@swansea.ac.uk  
 
The ten articles in this special issue were selected from those delivered at an international 
conference on terrorism and social media (#TASMConf) held at Swansea University, U.K., on 
27-28 June 2017. Organised by Swansea University’s Cyberterrorism Project 
(www.cyberterrorism-project.org), the conference was attended by 145 delegates from fifteen 
countries across six continents. In addition to academic researchers, these delegates included 
representatives from a range of non-academic stakeholders including Facebook, Tech Against 
Terrorism, law enforcement, NATO CCD-COE, the U.K.’s Home Office, the U.S. State 
Department, and the BBC. Six keynote presentations were delivered, videos of which are 
available free-to-access online. i  The keynote speakers were Max Hill QC (the U.K.’s 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation), Dr. Erin Marie Saltman (Facebook’s Policy 
Manager overseeing counterterrorism and counter-extremism efforts in Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa), Sir John Scarlett (former Head of MI6), and Professors Maura Conway 
(Dublin City University), Philip Bobbitt (Columbia Law School), and Bruce Hoffman 
(Georgetown University). In addition, a total of 53 other speakers presented their research into 
terrorists’ use of social media and responses to this phenomenon. These speakers were drawn 
from a range of academic disciplines including law, criminology, psychology, security studies, 
politics, international relations, media and communication, history, war studies, English, 
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linguistics, Islamic studies, and Computer Science. This emphasis on interdisciplinarity is 
evident in the articles in this special issue. A number of the speakers were also early career 
researchers or postgraduate research students; this emphasis on nurturing young researchers is 
also reflected in the contents of this special issue.  
 
The articles chosen for inclusion in the special issue have a focus on so-called ‘Islamic State’ 
(IS) and their online activity. Not all the papers have IS as their exclusive focus, but all those 
with, for example, a comparative remit have IS as one of the comparator cases.  The TASM 
conference took place at around the same time as IS’s loss of their Iraqi ‘capital’ of Mosul, but 
some months prior to the loss of their Syrian ‘capital,’ Raqqa. A slight but steady overall 
downward trajectory in IS’s online content output could be apprehended over the course of 
2017, with a precipitous decline on the October loss of Raqqa.ii Output quantities have since 
rebounded, though not (yet?) to the levels of 2015 and 2016.iii Many of the articles in this 
special issue treat aspects of IS’s online activity, including the content and nature of their 
magazines and videos,  their online targeting of females, strategies of online disruption targeted 
against them, in the period 2014 to 2017. Together therefore the collected articles supply a 
useful accounting of IS’s online ‘golden age.’  
 
In the opening article, doctoral candidate Maxime Bérubé and Benoit Dupont draw from social 
movement theory, particularly Charles Tilly’s concept of “action repertoire,” to devise the 
concept of “communicative action repertoire,” which is then elucidated through an analysis of 
the evolution of the global jihadist movement’s network of actors, the contexts in which its 
communications are undertaken, and its adaptation to new communication technologies. The 
role of Twitter is, of course, mentioned in the latter and is the core subject of the second article 
in the collection. In this paper, Gunnar Weimann details how and why Jabhat al-Nusra and IS 
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shifted from their previously heavy reliance on online forums to Twitter in the 2013 – 2014 
period. His argument, based on Arabic language statements by the two groups, along with those 
by jihadist forum administrators and other online activists, is that the ‘real world’ conflict 
playing out at that time between Jabhat al-Nusra and IS accelerated the migration to social 
media. Despite their schism, Jabhat al-Nusra and IS clearly share a set of core commitments. 
Less obvious perhaps are the overlaps between IS and a group such as Australia’s United 
Patriots Front (UPF). Nonetheless, in her paper, PhD student Imogen Richards examines how 
UPF has attempted, since its establishment in 2015, to legitimize itself through dialectical 
interactions with domestic and international politics, including IS. In particular, she analyzes 
publicly available online content produced by prominent UPF members, and posted to their 
Facebook pages, YouTube channels, and Twitter accounts, through the lens of dialectical 
theory. She finds both implicit and explicit conflation by UPF of the Islamic religion with IS 
terrorism. 
 
In her TASM Conference keynote speech, Prof. Maura Conway underlined that more research 
needed to be conducted in extremist visuals, including especially video productions. In their 
paper, Mark D. Robinson and Cori E. Dauber seek to provide researchers with a template for 
accomplishing exactly that. Robinson and Dauber, a media production professional and 
Professor of Communication respectively, describe their method for systematically grading the 
quality of extremist videos based on technical production criteria, which they then apply to a 
number of IS video productions, revealing periods when IS production capacity was debilitated 
(Fall 2015) and when it rebounded (Spring 2016). They advocate use of their method for, at a 
minimum, evaluating propaganda video output across time for not just IS, but a variety of other 
extremist and terrorist groups. Women are largely absent from IS videos, but were nevertheless 
an integral component of the overall ‘caliphate’ project. Lauren R. Shapiro and Marie-Helen 
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Maras apply social learning theory to data gained from open sources, largely court transcripts, 
in order to examine how 31 American females were radicalized by IS and their actions 
thereafter. Included in their findings are that a majority of the women used the Internet to begin 
(77%) and throughout (68%) their radicalization processes with, in terms of social media, 
Facebook and Twitter being the most heavily used platforms. Not only women, but also 
children were a key component of the IS project. In their article, PhD students Amy-Louise 
Watkin and Seán Looney, report the findings of their analysis of the 94 photographic images 
of children that appeared in four terrorist groups’ online magazines published between 2009 
and 2016. The magazines were Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Jihad Recollections and 
Inspire, IS’s Dabiq, the Taliban’s Azan, and Somali Al-Shabab’s Gaidi Mtanni. Dabiq 
contained the largest number of child images, with their focus changing over time from an 
initial emphasis on child victims of Western-backed warfare to portrayals of “fierce, 
prestigious child soldiers.” Dabiq was, furthermore, the only publication to exploit both 
genders in their images, using photographs of girl children to represent the ‘caliphate’ as a safe 
and agreeable place to live.  
 
Much of the content described and discussed in the first six papers in this collection is no longer 
as easily accessible as it once was. Significant pressure has been brought to bear in recent years 
by policymakers, media, and publics on internet companies to ‘clean up’ their platforms. The 
most significant disruption activity has been targeted at IS, as evidenced in Conway, et al.’s 
article. The focus of the latter is the levels of disruption experienced by IS supporters on Twitter 
as compared to that experienced by ‘Other Jihadis.’ According to Conway, et al., Twitter is no 
longer a conducive space for pro-IS accounts and communities to flourish. They also point out 
that not all jihadists on Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption as IS however, 
but that there is differential disruption taking place. IS’s and other jihadists’ online activity was 
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never solely restricted to Twitter, of course; it is just one node in a wider jihadist online 
ecology, which is addressed in the article too. Content and account take-down is certainly not 
the only, and perhaps not even the best, way to respond to extremists and terrorists’ use of the 
Internet. CREST’s Benjamin J. Lee advocates for informal or grassroots counter-messaging in 
his article, some of the benefits of which, including increased legitimacy and more aggressive 
messaging, he highlights. Lee is cognizant of the perils of such informal approaches too 
however, and draws attention to, for example, serious potential backlash against its producers.  
 
So major social media companies increasingly recognize the importance of preventing violent 
extremist and terrorist content from proliferating on their platforms, but less attention is paid 
to their fund-raising role. As well as presenting a threat, say RUSI’s Tom Keatinge and 
Florence Keen, the movement of terrorist fund-raising activities online creates a disruption 
opportunity. Their article argues that social media companies need to do at least two things to 
capitalize on this: 1.) display greater awareness of their vulnerability to supporting terrorist 
financing and 2.) collaborate more with law enforcement and financial service providers to 
improve the system in the face of abuses. Finally, a common question for researchers interested 
in the terrorism-internet nexus is ‘what’s the next big thing?’ Or ‘where are we going from 
here?’ Extremists and terrorists’ use of crypto-currencies is often now raised in this regard—
as it is by Keatinge and Keen, admittedly to point out its little use to-date—less attention has 
been paid thus far to blockchain technologies more generally however. Gareth Mott seeks to 
remedy this by reflecting on the implications of ‘the blockchain’ and peer-to-peer social 
networks in violent extremism and terrorism, including mitigation of the latter. He focuses, in 
particular, on the potential uses and abuses of the micro-blogging platform known as Twister. 
The latter’s users operate a blockchain combined with DHT- and BitTorrent-like protocols to 
make posts, receive entries from other users, and send private messages. The uptake of this or 
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similar decentralized social networks by extremists and/or terrorists would present significant 
challenges for current counter-extremist practices, such as content takedown.  
 
i Recordings of the keynote presentations are available from www.cyberterrorism-project.org/tasm-conference-
2017.  
ii BBC Monitoring. ‘Analysis: Islamic State Media Output Goes Into Sharp Decline.’ BBC Monitoring, 23 
November 2017: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dnnj2k.  
iii BBC Monitoring. 2018. ‘IS Media Show Signs of Recovery After Sharp Decline.’ BBC Monitoring, 23 
February: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dov471.  
                                                     
